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COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS
car impairs the driver's ability to manage the car, in determining
whether excessive speed or a blowrout was the proximate cause of an
accident (Ronning v. State [Wis.], 200 N. W. 394), of the fact that a
blow-out of the front tire of an automobile running fifteen miles an
hour might cause the car to run into a ditch, in determining whether
any cause but defendant's negligence might possibly have caused an
accident (Klein v. Beeten et aL, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N. W. 736), and
of the fact that the speed of an automobile may be changed at differ-
ent points within a distance of a mile, in determining the admissibility
of evidence of a car's average speed for more than a mile before
striking a person (People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400).
But that the judicial notice of the automobile is not unlimited is shown
by the following recent cases, decided in 1920 and 1925, respectively:
Texas Co. v. Brandt et aL, 79 Okl. 97, 191 P. 166, in which the court
refused to take judicial notice that automobiles stopping and starting
at filling stations emit unusual noises and odors which travel from 50
to 125 feet, in a suit to enjoin the construction and operation of a
filling station; Sherwood v. American Ry. Express, 158 La. -, 103
So. 436, in which the court refused to notice the time which would be
required to repair an automobile injured in a collision, in determining
the adequacy of damages. F. W. F.
McLendon v. State, 105 So. 406 (Fla., 1925).
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-EXPERIMENTS-Defend-
ant resisted arrest by an officer, and in the struggle the officer was
fatally wounded by a shot from his own pistol. On trial for murder
in the first degree, defendant contended that the shot occurred acci-
dentally during the struggle. The prosecution maintained that the shot
was premeditated, being fired by defendant after getting some dis-
tance from the officer. No powder marks or burns were found on the
flesh of deceased. Held, paper and cloth targets at which experimental
shots were fired with the pistol which fired the fatal shot and similar
ammunition, at varying distances, to show that if the shot had been
fired as close to deceased as defendant claimed it would have left
powder marks and burns on the flesh of deceased, were not admissible,
unless it were first shown that the targets were similar to human flesh
in texture, vulnerability and susceptibility to powder marks and burns.
Experiments to be admissible in evidence must first be shown to have
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been performed under conditions similar to the circumstances of the
case. The court indicated that its opinion was supported by the weight
of authority; but an analysis of cases shows a decided conflict on this
point.
Of the cases cited by the court, only the following are directly
in point: State v. Justus, 11 Ore. 178, 8 P. 337 (1883); People v.
Fiori, 123 App. Div. 174, 108 N. Y. S. 416 (1908); Morton v. State
(Tex. Cr. App), 71 S. W. 281 (1902). In Lawrence v. State, 45 Fla.
42, 34 So. 87, Spires v. State, 50 Fla. 121, 39 So. 181, and Common-
wealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185, the general proposition that experi-
ments, to be admissible, must be shown to have been performed under
similar conditions to those in the case, was upheld, but the facts were
totally dissimilar to those of the instant case. In McAlpine v. Fdelity
and Guaranty Co., 134 Minn. 192, 158 N. W. 967 (a civil case), the
admission of such evidence was held to be discretionary with the trial
court. In the cases of Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30, 42 So. 692, and Peo-
ple v. Solani, 6 Cal. App. 103, 91 P. 654, it was not shown that the
gun and ammunition were similar to those used in firing the fatal shot.
Gibbons v. Territory, 5 Okl. Cr. 212, 115 P. 129, and State v. Fletcher,
24 Ore. 295, 33 P. 575, are not directly in point, as the shots in those
cases were fired into woodwork, not human flesh. Reagan v. State, 84
Tex. Cr. R. 468, 208 S. W. 523, held that experiments with white
paper were inadmissible, where the shot had passed into the body of
deceased through dark clothes. In Tesney v. State, 77 Ala. 33 (1884),
the court went so far as to exclude evidence of an experiment with
the same coat through which the victim was shot, though this case
may have been decided on the ground that a single experiment was
insufficient as the general rule is that, where the bullet first pene-
trates clothing, experimental evidence of the effect of a similar shot
on the same or similar material is admissible. (Newkirk v. State, 134
Md. 310, 106 A. 694; Pollock v. State, 136 Wis. 136, 116 N. W. 851;
State v. Nowells, 135 Iowa 53, 109 N. W. 1016; Huestis v. Xtna In-
surance Co., 131 Minn. 461, 155 N. W. 643; People v. Fitzgerald, 138
Cal. 39, 70 P. 1014; Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 93 Pa. 284; State v.
Asbell, 57 Kan. 398, 46 P. 770; Houston v. State, 264 S. W. 869
(Ark.); Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40, 148 S. W. 543; People v.
Clark, 84 Cal. 573, 24 P. 313; People v. Ferdinand, 229 P. 341 (Cal).
Cases holding directly contrary to the instant case, under almost iden-
tical facts, are Irby v. State, 18 Okl. Cr. 671, 197 P. 526; Thrawley v.
State, 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95, and State v. Jones, 41 Kan. 309, 21
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P. 265 (in which the principal contest was on other items of evidence).
A similar conclusion is reached in Beckett v. Northwestern Masonic
Aid Association, 67 Minn. 298, 69 N. W. 923, a civil case, in which
the substances of which the targets were composed was not clearly
stated, and in State v,. Asbell, supra, in which the targets themselves
were not introduced, but the testimony of witnesses as to the results
of the experiment was given. In all these cases differences in the sub-
stances used as targets and the flesh actually shot were considered as
going to the credibility, not the competency, of the evidence, and in
Irby %,. State, supra, and in Rodgers v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 1,245 S.W.
697, decided in 1921 and 1922, respectively, it was expressly held that
to make experimental testimony admissible it is not necessary that the
experiment be made under exactly similar circumstances to those of
the case. F.W.F.
REAL PROPERTY.
Farmers' Bank of Hickory v. Bradley. Kansas City Court of Appeals,
1925, 271 S. W. 857.
MORTGAGES-CONSTRUCTIVE SEVERANCE - GROW-
ING CORN. Action in replevin to recover growing corn, and dam-
ages for its detention. One Bassfield owed the plaintiff a large sum
of money, and gave the plaintiff his note secured by a chattel mortgage
on a field of growing corn. The corn stood on land owned by Bassfield,
but subject to a deed of trust in favor of the Central Mortgage Cum-
pany. The deed of trust was executed more than a year before the
chattel mortgage. Subsequently, the land was sold under the deed of
trust to the defendant, who took possession of the land anld corn, and
held the same until this action was filed. The plaintiff, as holder of the
chattel mortgage, contends that until foreclosure the title and owner-
ship of the land were in Bassfield. that the execution of the chattel
mortgage was a constructive severance of the ctop from the realty, and
therefore the crop did not pass to the purchaser of the land under
foreclosure. The court, agreeing with the contentions of the defend-
ant. admitted that there could be constructive severance of a growing
crop as between vendor and vendee, and held that the deed of trust
on the land covered the crops thereon until severed, and there could
be no constructive severance of the corn by the execution of a chattel
mortgage as against the deed of trust on the realty.
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